The African Growth and Opportunity Act, the US trade preference programme that has underpinned Washington commercial relationship with sub-Saharan Africa for 25 years, is facing its most serious existential threat yet. As the current legislation approaches expiration, a confluence of political forces in Washington and the rapid expansion of Chinese trade infrastructure across the continent is forcing African policymakers to confront a fundamental question: what comes after AGOA?
The legislation, first signed into law in 2000, offers qualifying African countries duty-free access to the US market for thousands of products. It has been renewed twice and has been credited with supporting legitimate growth in certain African export sectors, particularly in textiles and light manufacturing. However, it has always been a limited instrument, covering only products that already compete well in global markets and excluding many agricultural goods that African nations could produce competitively.
China Moves in Where the US Hesitates
In recent months, China has dramatically expanded its zero-tariff coverage for African goods under its own programme, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. According to data compiled by the African Development Bank, Chinese zero-tariff access now covers more product categories and a wider range of African nations than AGOA, with fewer conditionality requirements attached. For many African governments, the Chinese offer looks more practical, more predictable, and more aligned with their infrastructure investment needs.
Chinese trade with Africa has grown by an average of 18 percent annually over the past decade, reaching 282 billion dollars in 2023. Much of that growth has been in raw materials and capital goods, but China approach to agricultural trade and light manufacturing has become increasingly sophisticated, offering long-term supply contracts that give African farmers and factories the certainty they need to invest.
The contrast with the AGOA renewal debate in Washington could not be starker. In Congress, the programme has become entangled in the broader political fight over trade policy, with the current administration trade representative, Jamieson Greer, describing the legislation as insufficiently aligned with America First priorities. In testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, Greer suggested that AGOA days as an unconditional preference programme were numbered unless recipient countries demonstrated stronger reciprocal trade behaviour.
What African Countries Are Saying
For countries that have built export industries around AGOA preferences, the stakes are enormous. In Kenya, the textile and apparel sector employs over 100,000 people and depends heavily on the duty-free access the programme provides. In Ethiopia, leather and garment manufacturers have used AGOA to access the US market, though the country eligibility has been periodically suspended due to political instability. In Lesotho, the entire light manufacturing sector is structured around AGOA preferences, making the country economic model entirely contingent on the programme survival.
African trade ministers meeting in Addis Ababa for the African Union trade committee have called for a unified position on AGOA renewal. However, the continent diverging interests make a common stance difficult. Oil exporters, who have benefited from AGOA less than manufacturers, are less invested in its survival. Countries that have received Chinese infrastructure financing through the Belt and Road Initiative are aware of the diplomatic sensitivities involved in publicly choosing between Washington and Beijing.
The Structural Problem with AGOA
Beyond the geopolitical competition, AGOA has always suffered from a structural flaw: it was designed for an era when Africa main competitive advantage was low-wage labour in labour-intensive industries. That era has largely passed, replaced by automation, rising wages in parts of the continent, and increased competition from Southeast Asia. Without upgrades that include digital trade provisions, services market access, and investments in the logistics and regulatory capacity that African exporters actually need, AGOA is fighting a battle it was never equipped to win.
The European Union Everything But Arms arrangement, which offers duty-free, quota-free access to all goods from the world least-developed countries, has effectively surpassed AGOA in terms of market openness for the countries that qualify. African nations that have negotiated Economic Partnership Agreements with the EU have found them complicated but ultimately more durable than the ad hoc AGOA framework.
For the continent trade ministers, the AGOA debate is ultimately a proxy for a larger question: can Africa major trading partners offer relationships built on mutual interest rather than geopolitical competition, and can African nations navigate that competition without being forced to choose sides? The answer will shape the continent trade architecture for decades, well beyond whatever happens to the current legislation in Washington.