When Wagner Group was officially dissolved and replaced by the Russian Africa Corps in mid-2025, the Kremlin’s allies in Mali were promised a more effective and more professional security partnership. Nine months on, that promise appears to be unraveling. Civilian deaths have continued to mount, jihadist attacks have expanded in geographic reach, and Malian forces — now heavily reliant on Russian contractors — have shown limited capacity to contain, let alone roll back, the militant insurgency gripping the Sahel.
A detailed analysis by ADF Magazine and reporting by The Africa Report paint a picture of a security apparatus that has grown more dependent on Russian firepower and advisors, but no more effective at protecting civilians or degrading extremist networks. The Africa Corps personnel, observers note, have adopted a markedly ‘hands-off’ posture compared to Wagner’s controversial but sometimes effective direct-action approach — a strategy that may suit Moscow’s broader interest in maintaining influence without absorbing the political costs of heavy-handed operations.
The human toll has been staggering. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) withdrew in 2023 after a decade of operations, leaving a significant security vacuum. Since then, attacks by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) — an al-Qaeda-affiliated group — and other extremist formations have spread from their traditional strongholds in central and northern Mali into previously unaffected regions in the south and west.
Regional neighbors are watching with growing concern. The instability in Mali has begun spilling over into Burkina Faso and Niger, both of which have also pivoted toward Russian security partnerships following military coups that ousted Western-aligned governments. A coordinated regional response — once facilitated by French and other Western military presences — has become much harder to organize.
For the Malian government of Colonel Assimi Goita, the Africa Corps gamble reflects a broader strategic realignment driven partly by frustration with what Bamako viewed as insufficient support from France and its allies. But that frustration has yet to be replaced by a viable alternative. ‘The Russians came with promises,’ one Malian analyst told The Africa Report. ‘The jihadists are still here, and in some places they are stronger than before.’
The silence from the Kremlin about the Africa Corps mission’s difficulties is notable. Unlike the noisy, publicized interventions of Soviet-era proxy engagements, the current Russian footprint in Mali operates with minimal public accountability — a feature, some argue, that serves Moscow’s interests as much as Bamako’s, regardless of outcomes on the ground.