Bamako, Mali — When Assimi Goita seized power in Mali for the second time in less than two years, international mediators responded with the standard toolkit of condemnations, suspended aid programmes, and demands for a return to constitutional order. More than three years on, Goita is still in charge, and he appears more entrenched than ever. The question now preoccupying African Union mediators, regional leaders, and Western diplomatic circles alike is not when Mali will return to civilian rule, but whether the military leadership under Goita is systematically dismantling the institutions that would make that transition possible.
A detailed analysis of decisions taken by the ruling junta over the past twelve months reveals a pattern of power concentration that some legal scholars and senior military figures describe as a deliberate strategy rather than the product of chaos or inexperience. Key regulatory and oversight bodies have been placed under military-aligned administrators. The constitutional court has been restructured, with three of its seven members replaced in a process critics say lacked any credible legal basis. Senior civil servant positions across seven ministries have been filled with officers from the armed forces — a move presented as a transitional efficiency measure but widely seen as a mechanism for extending military oversight into every arm of government.
The Wagner Question
Central to the consolidation has been Mali deepening relationship with Russian private military contractors, whose presence in the country has expanded significantly since 2021. The contractors, described by the junta as military trainers and advisors rather than mercenaries, have provided the force with an operational capability it could not sustain independently — but their presence has also created a parallel power structure that operates outside the formal command architecture of the Malian armed forces. Several Malian military officers, speaking off the record, have expressed concern that the arrangement has created a two-tier command structure in which Russian operatives effectively outrank Malian counterparts in operational settings.
The junta has publicly rejected this characterisation, insisting that all foreign personnel operate under Malian authority. But the arrangement has deepened Mali international isolation. France withdrew its forces, and the United States has scaled back its security assistance programme. The ECOWAS regional bloc, which briefly suspended Mali after the first coup before easing pressure in hopes of a transition timeline, has grown visibly frustrated with what one senior official described as a process with no genuine destination.
Economic Dimensions
The consolidation is not purely political. The junta has moved to restructure key state-owned enterprises, placing military-affiliated administrators at the heads of the national mining company and the national airline — both significant revenue generators. Critics say the moves amount to a systematic redirection of state resources toward the military elite and its business associates, a pattern familiar from other Sahelian countries that have experienced extended military rule.
International monetary fund engagement with Mali remains frozen following the coup, leaving the country without formal access to credit facilities. The junta has sought to fill the gap through increased gold exports and informal financial arrangements with Gulf states, but economists tracking the country finances say the structural deficits are widening. Inflation has accelerated, the ouguiya currency has weakened against the CFA franc, and civil servant salaries have been delayed by an average of three weeks in each of the last four months.
What Neighbours Think
Across the Sahel, the pattern is being studied closely. Niger ruling junta, which has developed its own complex relationship with the Malian leadership, appears to be drawing a distinction between its own approach and Bamako. Intelligence assessments circulating among regional security analysts suggest that Niger military leadership has been more cautious about fully replacing civilian oversight mechanisms, maintaining at least the formal architecture of civil administration even as real power resides with the military council.
The African Union Peace and Security Council has placed Mali on its agenda for a closed session in late May, where the question of whether to impose targeted sanctions on members of the ruling council will be discussed. Several member states are reluctant, citing the precedent such a move would set and the risk of triggering a complete rupture with Bamako that would eliminate any remaining AU leverage.
The Longer View
History offers sobering precedents. Across Africa, military rulers who have moved to dismantle civilian oversight institutions have rarely returned to barracks voluntarily. The consolidation pattern in Mali — using constitutional reform as cover, accelerating control of revenue-generating state assets, deepening reliance on foreign security contractors as a counterbalance to the regular military — reads as a textbook approach to indefinite rule rather than a transitional arrangement.
Whether Goita faces meaningful internal pressure remains unclear. Several senior military officers who were part of the original 2020 coup council have been marginalised or removed from positions of influence over the past 18 months. One former officer, speaking from exile in a West African neighbouring country, said the institutional restructuring had made it functionally very difficult for any single actor within the military to move against the leadership. The consolidation, he noted with resignation, had been thorough.